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Abstract
Public transport systems have been targets in several terrorist attacks, notably in
recent years, resulting in tight security measures worldwide. However, individuals’ pri-
vacy and liberty often conflict with efforts towards safety and security, making it difficult
to assess the benefits of security measures balanced against the costs (e.g. citizens may
be stopped, searched and asked to provide personal identification data to authorities
without any particular reason). Henceforth, our research question asks, "to what ex-
tend would legitimate citizens sacrifice their privacy and liberty rights in exchange for
potentially safer and more secure travel?" This paper uses a stated choice experiment to
quantify individuals’ trade-offs between privacy and security within a real-life context,
namely rail travel in the UK. Using a nationwide sample, the empirical analysis yields
the importance of improvements in the security infrastructure and identifies areas of
concern with regard to privacy and liberty controlling for travel related factors. Fur-
ther, trade-offs across different security improvements for rail travel are quantified in
terms of individuals’ willingness to pay extra on top of the average ticket price.
Keywords: Rail, Privacy, Security, Liberty, Rail Travel, Stated Choices, Discrete Choice
Models
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1 Introduction
Following terrorist attacks targeting public transport systems worldwide, safety and security
have become a top priority in the policy agenda of many countries, and particularly the
UK. Security measures for air travel have historically received a great deal of attention,
but security authorities are now increasingly having to focus upon land-based mass transit
systems. These have become a target for terrorist groups due to their vulnerability and ease
of access arising from their intrinsically open nature. Additionally, mass transit systems can
be both the means and the target for the attack. Terrorists understand how the widespread
use of such transportation infrastructure under the fear of terrorist attack has the potential
to cause mass panic, disruption and fear.
Recent well known examples include the Madrid bombings of 11 March 2004 and the
London bombings of 7th July 2005.
• In Madrid a series of bombs exploded within minutes on 4 packed commuter trains,
killing 191 people and injuring 1,841 (BBC News, 2004).
• On the 7th July 2005, bombs exploded on three Tube trains and a bus in Central
London. The subsequent London Assembly report from the July bombings concluded
that plans, systems and processes that are intended to provide a framework for the
response to major incidents in London must be revised and improved (Greater London
Authority, 2006).
In responding to such targeting, the security authorities must adapt a wide range of policy
measures to mitigate the risk of such events occurring, and to deal with the consequences if
they do.
A range of measures may be adopted by authorities in seeking to deal with these chal-
lenges. In the UK, these have included legislation and regulations as well as other measures
such as campaigns raising awareness of the risk of attacks. Additionally, the UK Depart-
ment of Transport’s Transport Security and Contingencies Team (TRANSEC) (UK Dept.
for Transport, 2006) has an important role to play in regard to security arrangements for
multi-modal transportation systems. The picture is complicated by the fact that many of
these transportation systems are privately owned.
Potential compromise of individuals’ privacy and liberty is a countervailing concern. It
must be recognised that increased security measures - in many cases - require travellers’
compliance with privacy intrusive procedures including screening, release of personal data
and even an additional cost in the price of ticket and possible delays. Once implemented,
there is considerable pressure to retain such measures as an intelligence gathering tool to
pre-empt further attacks. Civil liberties advocates claim that the general imposition of such
measures (by comparison to their short term use) negatively affects civil liberties by eroding
the rights of the citizen (Crossman et al., 2007). Ultimately, they claim that the general
imposition of security measures are, in the long-term, counter-productive to dealing with
the terrorist threat and may actually be helping the terrorists achieve their objectives by
reducing trust in the state.
In the immediate aftermath of an event, citizens often report being prepared to undergo
compromises of their privacy and liberty in order to obtain security benefits. Respondents to
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a question in the 23rd report of the British Social Attitudes Survey indicated that they were
prepared to accept some loss of privacy and liberty to provide for security. For example, 71%
of respondents to this survey said that the implementation of compulsory identity cards for
all adults is a price worth paying for increased security. Also, 79% thought that allowing the
police to detain people for more than a week or so without charge, if the police suspect them
of involvement in terrorism, is ‘a price worth paying’. (Johnson and Gearty, 2007).
In this context, much of the analytical work with respect to improved security of public
transport has been focusing on the costs of security improvements and to a lesser extent
on the benefits of security. Quantifying the benefits of security is a difficult task, since the
monetisation of benefits is difficult to achieve and the total extent of the risk can never be
truly known (although with appropriate information and accurate analysis may be accurately
predicted). Furthermore, some of the security benefits might be difficult to pin down, such
as the deterrent effect of seeing security personnel at a station or the feelings of reassurance
that the presence of security measures can provide. Indeed, the latter has been identified as a
key benefit of many security measures (Clarke, 2008). In relation to certain policy measures
(for example, the National Identity Register) the government has listed the stated security
benefits as helping in the fight against terrorism and illegal immigration (Smith, 2008).
To date, individuals’ liberty, privacy and security have been generally examined through
opinion surveys. Examples include the February 2008 ICM Omnibus poll conducted for
the Joseph Rowntree Reform Trust (2008) and research like the British Social Attitudes
Survey 2006 (Johnson and Gearty, 2007). In the context of rail travel, in 2006 the UK
Department for Transport conducted capabilities trials of various passenger screening security
measures at stations as part of its London Underground and National Railway program
(LUNR) programme. This also includes public attitude surveys (UK Dept. for Transport,
2008). These concluded that the public accepted the need for security measures but would
not tolerate delays and invasions of privacy (UK Dept. for Transport, 2008).
An opinion questionnaire, however, would only be capable of collecting uni-dimensional
opinions (e.g. yes or no, sensitive vs. non sensitive, etc.) while these would be expressed
within a vague context. This is likely, however, to lead to ideologically based responses.
Clearly, opinion surveys do not offer the research basis for policy-making in the context of
security interventions. Hence, there is a need for an evidence-based approach that would
enable policy makers to evaluate the way various security measures reflect upon behavioural,
social and economic issues and, most importantly, effective resource allocation. Privacy
Impact Assessments (PIAs) consist a relatively recent tool that aim to take into consideration
the effect of new policy measures or initiatives upon individuals’ privacy. However, current
methodologies for undertaking such assessments only focus upon qualitative research methods
such as direct consultation, open meetings and focus groups to gather first hand data on
individual views on how certain measures or initiatives would affect their privacy (ICO,
2007).
While research on the security of public transport systems has been extensive from a
public spending and benefits perspective, individuals’ preferences have hardly been explored,
having been focused merely on opinion surveys. To the best of our knowledge, we are not
aware of any empirical research on quantifying individuals’ trade-offs for a specific set of
security, privacy and travel attributes concerning public transport.
The aim of this paper is to demonstrate how stated choice (SC) methods (Louviere et al.,
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2000) can be used in order to empirically examine how individuals trade-off between privacy
and security when they travel on the national rail system in the UK. In particular, the
objectives of this paper are to determine the key factors driving individuals’ choice between
alternative scenarios of rail travel and to determine individuals’ willingness-to-pay (WTP) for
specific aspects of security and privacy. Questions that guided this study include: (i) what
are the policy interventions that individuals would consider as important for their security
or just intrusive when they consider travelling on the national rail system? (ii) Is there any
heterogeneity in preferences among individuals? That is, do preferences vary according to
socio-demographic characteristics, ideology and attitudes? And finally, (iii) what is the WTP
of individuals for security related policy interventions?
Following this section, the paper is organised as follows. Firstly, we discuss the develop-
ment of the stated choice experiment and the administration of the data collection. Next, we
report the modelling results of this experiment, estimates of WTP and discuss the findings
of the analyses. Finally, conclusions and a discussion of policy implications are summarised
in the last section.
2. Methodology: Survey Design and Administration
2.1 Stated Choice Experimental Design
The rationale for using stated choice methods in this study is based on the absence of exist-
ing data (i.e., revealed preferences) that would enable the investigation of issues related to
individuals’ security, privacy and liberty. In particular, it was necessary to capture individu-
als’ willingness to trade-off privacy and liberty against improved security. Moreover, stated
choice methods enable the researcher to quantify these trade-offs in terms of willingness-
to-pay (WTP) for a particular security improvement. The research objective in this study
was to examine whether security improvements concerning rail travel would be acceptable
by individuals and what factors are likely to influence individuals’ decisions when privacy,
liberty and security may be in conflict. Stated choice methods were therefore judged to have
the potential to provide useful insights in answering such questions.
Stated choice (SC) methods are a methodological toolkit that has been used extensively
in the fields of marketing, health, environmental and transport economics (Louviere and
Woodworth, 1983, Louviere, 1992, Louviere et al., 2000, Ryan et al., 2001). SC methods elicit
respondents’ choices from hypothetical - though realistic - scenarios that describe different
options using a set of attributes and their levels (values). The choices expressed indicate
the relative importance of the attributes that characterise the scenarios (see, Hensher et al.,
2005, Louviere et al., 2000).
Application of stated choice methods is particularly useful when alternatives or certain
characteristics of these alternatives are currently not available. For example, this can be the
case with alternatives that involve new technologies or new policy interventions. The objec-
tive is to replicate individuals’ decision-making structures to understand the combinations
of features or attributes that consumers value the most. Further, stated choice methods
recognise that there are no "perfect" choices. Each alternative option has a particular set
of advantages and disadvantages that an individual must explicitly trade-off when selecting
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between competing options. Thus, individuals are presented with competing options and are
asked to jointly compare the options based on their attributes. Stated choice methods’ main
drawback, however, is that such data is based around what individuals state they would do
in hypothetical situations, which may not exactly correspond with what they would do if
faced with the same choice in real life (Arrow et al., 1993, Blackburn et al., 1994).
Relevant attributes and their levels were identified through in-depth interviews with data
protection (Hosein, 2008) and security officials (Clarke, 2007, Clarke, 2008), press-articles
(BBC, 2006) and literature review research (Cozens et al., 2002, UK Dept. for Transport,
2008, UK Dept. for Transport, 2006, Srinivasan et al., 2006). The trade-offs introduced
to respondents involved three main categories of relevant attributes: security improvements
in terms of surveillance equipment and presence of personnel and security checks; potential
benefits such as likelihood that a terrorist plot may be disrupted and how things may be
handled in case an incident occurs, and travel related characteristics such as waiting time to
pass through security and additional cost to cover security improvements. The complete list
of attributes and levels used in the choice experiment is shown in Table 1.
Table 1: Attributes and levels of the rail travel scenarios
Attribute Levels
Type of camera (1) None
(2) Standard CCTV cameras
(3) Standard CCTV and new cameras that automatically identify
individuals
Time required
to pass through
security
(1) 1 minute
(2) 2-3 minutes
(3) 4-7 minutes
(4) 8-10 minutes
(5) 11-15 minutes
Type of security
check
(1) No Checks
(2) Pat down and bag search for 1 in 1000 travellers
(3) Pat down and bag search for 2 in 1000 travellers
(4) Pat down and bag search for 10 in 1000 travellers
(5) Metal detector / X-ray for all
Presence of the
following type of
security
personnel
(1) Rail Staff
(2) Rail Staff and British transport police
(3) Rail Staff, British transport police and armed police
(4) Rail Staff, British transport police, armed police and
uniformed military
Increase on
price of ticket to
cover security
(1) £0.75
(2) £1.00
(3) £1.50
(4) £3.00
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Number of
known terrorist
plots disrupted
(1) 1 plot disrupted every 10 years
(2) 1-2 plots disrupted every 10 years
(3) 2-3 plots disrupted every 10 years
(4) 5 plots disrupted every 10 years
(5) 10 plots disrupted every 10 years
(6) 20 plots disrupted every 10 years
Visibility of
response to a
security incident
(1) If an incident occurs you are not aware of it
(2) If an incident occurs then you are aware of that when you get
back home
(3) If an incident occurs things are handled with minimal
disruption
(4) If an incident occurs there is some disruption and chaos
(5) If an incident occurs there is lots of disruption and chaos
The SC experiment in this study was set in the context of choosing between three alter-
native options each describing situations that the respondent may experience upon travelling
on UK’s national rail network. In particular, respondents were asked to "Imagine that you
are making a journey using public transport, such as on the national railway system. We
would like you then to consider three ways in which you might make this journey. These
are described by different levels of security or privacy". As shown in Figure 1, an additional
fourth option in the scenario allowed respondents to opt-out from choosing one of the first
three alternatives, stating, "I would choose not to use the rail system under any of these
conditions". Each alternative differed in terms of security measures, potential benefits from
improved security, and travel related characteristics.
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Figure 1: A choice scenario example
The combination of all attributes and levels would result in a significantly large number of
choice scenarios, which would be impractical to present as a whole to respondents. Therefore,
we constructed an experimental design matrix consisting of 120 scenarios using the SAS
macros for discrete choice experiments (Kuhfeld, 2009). While the combination of attributes
and attribute levels in Table 1 (i.e., 33 ∗ 59 ∗ 46 ∗ 63) does not result into an absolutely
orthogonal design matrix, the 120 scenarios consist a well-conditioned matrix, which would
explain main effects with reasonable statistical efficiency (Bliemer and Rose, 2006, Louviere
et al., 2000). Each respondent received a random sample of eight different choice scenarios.
Some additional constraints were applied to the design matrix to ensure that the scenarios
were internally consistent. First, security checks could not be performed using "Metal detector
- X-ray" applied to all travellers if the waiting time within an alternative option was less
than four (4) minutes. Second, to allow for realistic representation of a choice scenario,
when uniformed military was proposed, then other security improvements (i.e., advanced
Closed Circuit Television (CCTV) cameras that enable real-time face recognition) and tighter
security checks (i.e., more than 2 checks in 1,000 travellers) should be in place. Overall,
we attempted to control for other cases, so that none of the choice scenarios would seem
unrealistic or dominant compared to the other two options.
2.2 Background Questions
In addition to the stated choice scenarios, data were also collected on the social and economic
characteristics of the respondents (e.g., age, gender, employment status, income, frequency
7
of travel by rail, etc.) and their media preferences including newspapers and news channels.
Also, respondents were asked general questions about their attitudes towards security, liberty
and privacy known as the "Distrust Index" (Kumaraguru and Cranon, 2005, Louis Harris et
al., 1994). Finally, the survey included a number of cognitive questions concerning the SC
scenarios. The cognitive questions were designed to ensure that respondents understood and
attributed meanings to the choice scenarios that were consistent both with the intent of the
survey and with the interpretations of the other survey respondents.
2.3 Survey Implementation and Data
The stated choice experiment was conducted through the Internet between the 17 and 19
September 2008. Prior its official release, the survey instrument was modified in accordance
with post-survey cognitive questions from pilot-surveying 260 individuals between 27 and 29
June 2008. The 2,058 participants in the final sample were recruited from a nation-wide
panel of Internet users who were registered with "Research Now" (www.researchnow.co.uk
), a market research agency with the largest panel of Internet users in the UK. The e-mail
invitation to the survey was originally sent to 15,214 individuals yielding a response rate of
approximately 24%, after excluding the number of individuals who did not meet eligibility
criteria (e.g. age < 18 years) (0.8%), provided incomplete information (7.9%) or the sample
quota had already been collected (4.5%). Descriptive statistics of the sample are reported in
Table 2.
The sample represents well the general population in terms of gender and age. As
expected with Internet surveys, however, the proportion of individuals with high level of
education in the sample is remarkably higher than the proportions in 2001 UK Census
(www.statistics.gov.uk/census2001). In comparison with employment status of our sam-
ple (see Table 2), our data over-represents retired individuals (28% vs. 13.4%) and under-
represents students compared to the 2001 UK census. Clearly, because of the use of the
Internet as the data collection mode and differences in the socio-economic profiles of our
sample compared to the 2001 UK census, there could be no claim that the collected sam-
ple is statistically representative of the UK population. However, one may argue that it is
representative of an active segment of the population in the UK, which does match with the
demographic profiles (age and gender) of the UK census.
With regard to their attitudes to privacy, liberty and security, as reported in Table 2,
95.8% of the respondents rated the statement "protecting the privacy of my personal infor-
mation" as important or very important. Also, 96.3% agreed that "taking action against
important security risks" was important or very important. Interestingly, a remarkably lower
percentage (85.7%) of respondents - as compared with the previous statements - agreed that
"defending current liberties and human rights" was important or very important. The re-
sponses of participants to the distrust index questions (Kumaraguru and Cranon, 2005, Louis
Harris et al., 1994) showed that 33.8% of respondents had high levels of distrust whereas only
a 4.8% had no distrust at all. Finally, based on newspaper preferences, respondents were
classified ideologically into conservative (55.8%) and non-conservative (44.2%).
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Table 2: Sample characteristics (Sample size: 2,058)
Variable Sample (%) 2001 UK Census (%)
Gender: Female 52 52
Age Group
18-24 7 16
25-34 13 16
35-44 19 19
45-54 18 16
55-64 21 14
65 and over 22 20
Education Level
None 11 29
O level / GCSE 32 36
A level / CSE 26 8
Graduate 32 20
Other - 7
Occupational Status
Working full-time 42 59.6
Working part-time 16
Student 4 7.2
Retired 28 13.4
Seeking work 3 4.5
Other 7 15.3
Annual Income
Less than £29,000 58 -
£30,000 - £69,999 26 -
£70,000 or higher 2 -
Not reported 14 -
Rail user 80.1 -
Attitudes to Privacy, Liberty and Security
Privacy concerned 95.8 -
Liberty Concerned 85.7 -
Security Concerned 96.3 -
Distrust Index
High 33.8 -
Medium 37.9 -
Low 23.5 -
No Distrust 4.8 -
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3. Results and Discussion
The stated preference data were first checked for accuracy. Sixty-six (66) records were dis-
carded as these were respondents who felt that they did not understand the survey (Rouwen-
dal and De Blaeij, 2004). Also, as in any stated preference survey, there is a risk of non-trading
behaviour, that is respondents always choosing the same option, and this can have significant
impact on model results (Hess et al., 2008). To alleviate these issues, the 31 respondents
who consistently chose the same option across the eight scenarios were also excluded from
the analysis. Thus, the analysis of the stated choice scenarios was conducted using 1,961
observations.
Prior to the analysis, the stated choice data were dummy coded according to the levels
of the attributes (Hensher et al., 2005). In addition, the time required to pass through
security, increase on price of ticket to cover security and the number of known terrorist plots
disrupted attributes were also tested as cardinal-linear variables in the model specification.
Consequently, the time required to pass though security took the levels 1, 2.5, 5.5, 9 and 13
minutes.
Similarly, the number of known terrorist plots disrupted was coded as 1, 1.5, 2.5, 5, 10,
and 20. The choice experiment attributes in the "I would choose not to use the rail system
under any of these conditions" option were coded with zero values for each of the attributes .
3.1 Conditional Logit Model Specification
The stated choices experiment was designed with the assumption that the observable utility
function would follow a strictly additive form. The model was specified so that the prob-
ability of selecting a particular option was a function of seven attributes. Using ALOGIT
(2005) and the 15,688 choices elicited from 1,961 respondents, the highest value of the log-
likelihood function was found for the specification shown in the first column of Table 3. The
model reported has been corrected for the interdependence of SP observations (i.e., multiple
responses per individual) using the "jack-knife" procedure.
The overall fit of the model, as measured by McFadden’s ρ2 indicates a moderate fit, and
the coefficients are statistically significant and intuitively correct. All the potential security
attributes that may compete with privacy and liberty are significant factors in the choice of a
particular scenario of travel on the national rail network in the UK. The positive signs on the
majority of the coefficients related to improved security measures, including type of camera,
security checks and the presence of specialised security personnel, show that these measures
act to increase the probability that a particular travel situation (option) is selected.
Table 3: MNL estimation results
Variable Coeff. t-stat
Type of security camera
None Base -
Standard CCTV 0.5523 16.2
Advanced CCTV
x (1, if liberty unconcerned; 0 otherwise) 1.1168 10.6
x (1, if liberty concerned and education A-level or lower; 0 otherwise) 0.8856 18.5
x (1, if liberty concerned and education higher than A-level; 0 otherwise) 0.6356 10.6
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Type of security check
No checks Base -
Pat down and bag search for 1 in 1,000 travellers 0.2341 6.5
Pat down and bag search for 2 in 1,000 travellers 0.2341 6.5
Pat down and bag search for 10 in 1,000 travellers
x (1, if white collar worker; 0 otherwise) 0.2341 6.5
x (1, if blue collar worker; 0 otherwise) 0.4454 8.9
Metal detector and X-rays for all
x (1, if female; 0, otherwise) 0.83 11.2
x (1, if male and education level is A-level or higher; 0 otherwise) 0.2341 6.5
x (1, if male and education level is lower than A-level; 0 otherwise) 0.83 11.2
Presence of the following type of security personnel
Rail staff Base -
Rail staff and British transport police 0.1974 8.1
Rail staff, British transport police and armed police
x (1, if white collar conservative or blue collar; 0 otherwise) 0.1974 8.1
Rail staff, British transport police, armed police and uniformed military
x (1 if blue collar worker; 0 otherwise) 0.1974 8.1
x (1 if white collar worker and conservative; 0 otherwise) 0.163 2.8
x (1 if white collar worker and non conservative; 0 otherwise) -0.1992 -3.7
Increase on price of ticket to cover security
x (1, annual income is less than £20,000; 0 otherwise) -0.3321 -12.6
x (1, annual income is £20,000 or higher ; 0 otherwise) -0.2245 -8.6
x (1, annual income is not reported; 0 otherwise) -0.459 -8.7
Time required to pass through security -0.0732 -25.6
Number of known terrorist plots disrupted (the three following terms are additive)
x (1) 0.2963 13
x (1, if plots greater than 2.5; 0 otherwise) -0.2285 -9.0
x (1, if plots greater than 10; 0 otherwise) -0.0433 -5.7
Visibility of response to a security incident
If an incident occurs you are not aware of it Base -
If an incident occurs then you are aware of that when you get back home 0 0
If an incident occurs things are handled with minimal disruption 0 0
If an incident occurs there is some disruption and chaos -0.3555 -13.6
If an incident occurs there is lots of disruption and chaos -0.6502 -13.5
Variables in the "I would choose not to use the rail system under any of these conditions"
Male 0.3129 3.3
Individual is highly distrustful (1, if Distrust Index = High; 0 otherwise) -0.2308 -2.3
Individual lives in Southern UK (1, if yes; 0 otherwise) 0.4144 3.5
Age 18 - 24 (1, if yes; 0 otherwise) -0.714 -3.2
Individual is security concerned (1, if yes; 0 otherwise) -1.2336 -4.9
Individual travels by rail at least twice a year (1, if yes; 0 otherwise) -0.3481 -2.9
Individual attends public events more than once per year (1 if yes; 0 otherwise) -0.2694 -2.6
Constant, Option 1 -1.5768 -6.2
Constant, Option 2 -1.5555 -6.1
Constant, Option 3 -1.7689 -6.8
No. of observations 1961* 8 = 15,688
Log-likelihood function: sample shares (constants only), L(c) -21,386.10
Log-likelihood function: model, L(b) -19,150.00
Rho-square (0) [ρ2 = 1 - [L(b)/L(0)] 0.105
Rho-square (c) [ρ2 = 1 - [L(b)/L(c)] 0.119
Following an initial phase of model development that used generic coefficients for all re-
spondents in the sample, we tested whether different groups of respondents placed different
valuations on any of the attributes in the choice experiment. To identify possible differences
we examined cross tables that summarised the in-the-sample predictive ability of the model.
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These tests were conducted on a comprehensive list of respondent’s attitudes (e.g. the Dis-
trust Index) and background variables including age group, gender, socio-economic group,
income band and education level.
The negative signs on the price and time required to pass through security coefficients
indicate that respondents made rational choices and prefer alternatives that are less costly and
require shorter times to pass through security checks. Also, the valuation on the increase of
ticket price was different across income bands. As expected, respondents in the lowest income
band (<£20,000 per year) placed a higher value on the potential extra cost of the ticket to
cover security than respondents belonging in the higher income band (>£20,000 per year).
Interestingly, respondents who refused to report their income placed an even higher value on
the cost of the ticket. General trends regarding the acceptability of related fare increases and
time delays are in line with previous opinion surveys undertaken in the UK (UK Dept. for
Transport, 2005, UK Dept. for Transport, 2006, UK Dept. for Transport, 2008).
Overall, respondents would prefer travel situations that offer some type of monitoring
system, being either standard CCTV cameras or advanced CCTV cameras that enable real-
time face recognition. The value placed on improving CCTV cameras to advanced CCTV
cameras differed if respondents were identified as liberty concerned and also, according to
respondents’ education level. In particular, respondents with higher education level placed a
lower value on the presence of advanced CCTV cameras compared to individuals with lower
education level (i.e., A-level or lower). These results agree with previous opinion surveys and
focus-group research findings. For example, respondents in the Crime Concern/Transport and
Travel Research (1997) felt that a broad range of measures including more staff, improved
levels of lighting, CCTV and help points might enhance security and perceptions of personal
security for a wide variety of public transport settings. Also, the UK Department of Transport
(2006) opinion poll found that respondents were in general comfortable with the presence of
CCTV cameras at rail stations.
With regard to the type of security check, respondents would generally prefer travel
situations that involve some type of security check. This finding agrees with findings from
the UK Department for Transport (2005) study where the majority (71%) of respondents
supported the use of body searches at least twice a week or more. It is worth noting, however,
that our study findings indicate that, on average, respondents would prefer less intrusive
security checks (i.e., X-ray imaging) than hand searching. Moreover, different segments of
respondents in the sample (white vs. blue collar workers) placed different values on pat down
and bag search for 10 in 1,000 travellers whereas preferences for metal detector and x-rays
for all were different across gender and education level.
Concerning the different levels of security personnel, the estimation results highlight that
respondents would prefer travel situations where more specialised security personnel - other
than rail staff only - are present at rail stations. Evidence from previous research has shown
that more uniformed staff has been found to enhance security awareness (Collins, 1993,
quoted from Cozens et al., 2002). As shown in Table 3, blue-collar and conservative white-
collar workers placed higher value to the presence of more specialised personnel even for
the presence of uniformed military. In contrast, non-conservative white-collar workers were
less likely to choose a situation where uniformed military were present over situations with
rail staff only. The number of known terrorist plots disrupted attribute was considered as a
potential benefit of improved security measures. While the true number of plots is unbounded
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and could not be easily quantified nor even defined, we used as the baseline of 30 terrorist
plots known to the authorities as defined from statements from the Head of MI5, Jonathan
Evans in (2007) and also, Dame Eliza Manningham-Buller (2006) former Head of MI5 to
define the range of the number of known terrorist plots disrupted attribute.
One of our hypotheses here was that respondents would trade-off security improvements
that would allow more terrorist plots to be disrupted against intrusions on liberty or pri-
vacy . In line with a priori expectations, as shown in Table 3, respondents would prefer
situations where more terrorist plots are disrupted. The estimated coefficients are the result
of a piecewise-linear specification with two points of inflection at 2.5 and10 plots every 10
years, which show that the marginal utility of this attribute increases as the number of plots
increases.
Also, the results show that respondents found no different between levels one and two
of the visibility of response to a security incident attribute. However, there were less likely
to choose options where an incident would cause some disruption or lots of disruption and
chaos.
Finally, the estimation results provided an indication of the respondents who were more
or less likely to opt-out and choose the forth option offered, i.e. indicate that they would not
travel on the rail network under any of the situations offered. As shown in Table 3, males,
respondents who scored high values of the Distrust Index and those living in the southern
parts of Great Britain were more likely to opt-out. In contrast, individuals aged between
18-24 years, security concerned, frequent rail travellers and people who attend public events
were more likely to choose one of the first three options.
3.2 Willingness to Pay Estimates
The Stated Choices method is consistent with utility maximisation and demand theory (Lou-
viere et al., 2000, Ortuzar and Willumsen, 2001). Once parameter estimates are obtained
by the use of the most appropriate model, a willingness-to-pay (WTP) measure for changes
in the level of a given attribute can be derived (Hensher et al., 2005). Let represents the
utility of the base level (e.g., no cameras) for a segment in the sample i (e.g. males) with
proportion αi; and represents the utility of the same segment i for a security improvement
(e.g., advanced CCTV cameras) compared to base level. The coefficient of the price increase
on ticket to cover security, βprice, gives the marginal utility of price:
WTP = −β−1priceln
q
i αi ∗ exp(V
1
1
)
q
i αi ∗ exp(V
0
i )
(1)
In a simple linear model each attribute in the utility expression and price are associated
with one coefficient each. In that case, equation [1] can be simplified for any individual to
the ratio of two utility parameters and provide an estimate of WTP:
WTP = −1(
βsecurityintervention
βprice
) (2)
The best fitting model in this study describes utility functions with segmentation with
respect to some of the interventions with the respondents’ characteristics and also segmenta-
tion on the cost coefficient βprice, across three income bands (see Table 3). Estimates can be
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used to calculate the value assigned by the respondents to each of the security improvements,
potential benefits and the time delay to go through security.
Table 4 presents a weighted average measure of willingness-to-pay (WTPwa) over income
groups is given as:
WTPwa =
ÿ
j
δj ∗ WTPj (3)
where δj is the proportion of respondents in the sample under income band j (i.e., less
than £20,000; more than £20,000; unknown). WTPj is the willingness-to-pay of individuals
belonging to income band j and can be calculated by applying equation [1] to each of the j
income bands:
WTPj = −βjpriceln(
q
i αi ∗ exp(V
1
i )q
i(α ∗ exp(V
0
i ))
(4)
The results show that on average respondents derive significant values from improved
security measures. The highest (weighted average) valuations, £4.44 and £3.54 on top of the
average price of a ticket, were placed on the efforts to increase the effectiveness of security
authorities, namely to able to disrupt terrorist plots - i.e., 20 plots and 10 plots per 10 years,
respectively. The next highest valuation of £3.13 was placed for reducing waiting times to
pass through security from 13 minutes to 1 minute. With regard to CCTV cameras at rail
stations, respondents perceived security benefits of the more privacy intrusive cameras to
outweigh their possible concerns about privacy, and therefore, place a value of £3.10 for
advanced CCTV cameras that enable face recognition to be installed at rail stations. Also,
respondents placed an average willingness to pay value of £2.41 for improving security checks
to measures involving metal detectors and X-rays for all. Finally, respondents perceived that
more specialised security personnel would be necessary. However, the presence of uniformed
military was valued less than other types of security personnel.
Table 4: WTP estimates in British Pounds
Base level Change level <£20,000 >£20,000 Unknown W T Pwa
Type of security camera
None Standard CCTV 1.66 (0.34) 2.46 (0.66) 1.20 (0.31) 2.03
None Advanced CCTV 2.55 (0.46) 3.77 (0.93) 1.84 (0.44) 3.10
Type of security check
No checks Pat down and bag
search for 1 in 1,000
travellers
0.71 (0.23) 1.04 (0.37) 0.51 (0.18) 0.86
No checks Pat down and bag
search for 2 in 1,000
travellers
0.71 (0.23) 1.04 (0.37) 0.51 (0.19) 0.86
No checks Pat down and bag
search for 10 in 1,000
travellers
0.95 (0.24) 1.40 (0.42) 0.69 (0.21) 1.15
No checks Metal detector and
X-rays for all
1.98 (0.43) 2.93 (0.79) 1.43 (0.39) 2.41
Presence of the following type of security personnel
Rail staff Rail staff and British
Transport Police
0.59 (0.16) 0.88 (0.28) 0.43 (0.14) 0.72
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Rail staff Rail staff, British
Transport Police and
Armed Police
0.43 (0.12) 0.64 (0.20) 0.31 (0.10) 0.52
Rail staff Rail staff, British
transport police,
armed police and
uniformed military
0.23 (0.18) 0.34 (0.27) 0.17 (0.14) 0.28
Visibility of response to a security incident
If an incident occurs
there is lots of disrup-
tion and chaos
If an incident oc-
curs then you are not
aware of it
1.96 (0.41) 2.90 (0.78) 1.42 (0.37) 2.38
If an incident occurs
there is lots of disrup-
tion and chaos
If an incident occurs
then you are aware of
it when you get back
home
1.96 (0.41) 2.90 (0.78) 1.42 (0.37) 2.38
If an incident occurs
there is lots of disrup-
tion and chaos
If an incident oc-
curs then things are
handled with mini-
mal disruption
0.89 (0.22) 1.31 (0.40) 0.64 (0.20) 1.08
If an incident occurs
there is lots of disrup-
tion and chaos
If an incident occurs
then there is some
disruption and chaos
0.00 (0.00) 0.00 (0.00) 0.00 0.00
Time required to pass through security
13 min 1 min 2.66 (0.46) 3.73 (0.94) 1.94 (0.45) 3.13
13 min 2.5 min 2.23 (0.40) 3.47 (0.82) 1.70 (0.39) 2.82
13 min 5.5 min 1.66 (0.28) 2.48 (0.59) 1.21 (0.28) 2.04
13 min 9 min 0.89 (0.15) 1.32 (0.31) 0.65 (0.15) 1.08
Number of known terrorist plots that may be disrupted
1 plot / 10 years 20 plots / 10 years 3.63 (0.60) 5.41 (1.26) 2.65 (0.61) 4.44
1 plot / 10 years 10 plots / 10 years 2.89 (0.48) 4.30 (1.05) 2.10 (0.48) 3.54
1 plot / 10 years 5 plots / 10 years 1.86 (0.34) 2.77 (0.68) 1.36 (0.33) 2.28
1 plot / 10 years 2-3 plots / 10 years 1.35 (0.29) 2.01 (0.56) 0.98 (0.26) 1.65
1 plot / 10 years 1-2 plots / 10 years 0.45 (0.1) 0.67 (0.18) 0.33 (0.08) 0.55
4. Conclusions
This paper is a first attempt to employ Stated Preference Discrete Choice Modelling (SPDCM)
methods in order to assess people’s preferences across security, privacy and liberty. The case
study focuses on a real-life situation under which individuals are about to travel using UK’s
national rail network. Estimates obtained from the development of a conditional multino-
mial logit model indicate the respondents’ characteristics to the valuation of security, privacy
and liberty issues in the context of rail travel are statistically significant. Also, the results
indicate that on average, respondents are willing to pay for security improvements implying
that potential concerns about privacy and security are outweighed by their preferences for
security. However, we do identify segments in the sample that are against measures that
involve for example, presence of uniformed military at rail stations.
Throughout this paper, it is shown that application of SPDCM methods can be a com-
prehensive toolkit for risk assessment that enables researchers to address these issues in a
systematic way. In particular, it allows researchers to obtain views of citizens subject to
varying levels of security infrastructure and measures, and quantify the trade-offs in mone-
tary terms (i.e., WTP). For example, within the context of privacy impact assessments, the
application of such methods would allow researchers to identify the gap between policy and
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preferences and respond to cases where security runs counter to popular preferences, or where
there is a need to adjust policy without losing security benefits.
In terms of lessons learnt for further research, we identify three main factors. Firstly, the
experiment was based on an Internet panel. Although this panel was statistically consistent
with UK’s 2001 Census, the long-term validity of conclusions based on a panel of Internet
users remains open to further discussion. Were this study to be carried out in a formal policy
context prior to the implementation of certain measures, then greater consideration of a
different approach to fieldwork would be given. Secondly, greater preliminary research focus
could be placed on the definitions (of what constitutes privacy and liberty). A pragmatic
approach was taken in interpretation as to how individuals’ rights might be affected by each
of the policy measures being considered in the context of travel on the national rail network,
but to permit broader analysis, further consideration might be given to selecting the measures
on the basis of their impact upon privacy or liberty in order to maximize the possibilities
for further analysis. Finally, in order to maximize understanding and accessibility of the
stated preference discrete choice element to the experiment, some attributes were shortened
or concatenated. An example of this can clearly be seen in the absence of an indication
of what constitutes the average ticket price. This rendered comparisons of relative WTP
difficult and open to interpretation. There is a great deal of variation in ticket prices ranging
from £14.90 for a Greater London Day Travelcard to £179.00 for a return Inter-city ticket.
Explaining, identifying and characterizing such information prior to the stated preferences
experiment was deemed to be too complex and would further confuse respondents. Further
refinement of the methodology might include a focus or greater consideration being given to
this attribute, in order to arrive at a robust definition of WTP given relative ticket prices.
Acknowledgements
The work reported in this paper was undertaken as part of RAND Europe’s research project
on "Measuring Trade-offs between Privacy, Security and Liberty" funded by the RAND Eu-
rope’s Board of Trustees fund. Writing of this paper, in particular, was made possible through
RAND Europe’s Alice Farrands’ Memorial Scholarship awarded to the first author. Last but
not least, the authors would like to thank Daniel Jones and Hans Pung for their useful
comments and suggestions.
References
• ALOGIT (2005) HCG Software, http://www.alogit.com, London.
• Arrow, K., Solow, R., Portney, P.R., Leamer, E.E., Radner, R. & Shuman, H. (1993)
Report of the NOAA panel on contingent valuation. Federal Register, 58, 4601-4614.
• BBC (2006) Extracts from MI5 chief’s speech (Interview of Eliza Manningham-Buller),
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/6135000.stm, London.
• BBC News (2004) BBC News Special Reports: Madrid Train Attacks, http://news.
bbc.co.uk/2/hi/in_depth/europe/2004/madrid_train_attacks/default.stm, BBC
16
News, London.
• Blackburn, M., Harrison, G.W. & Rutstrom, E.E. (1994) Statistical bias functions and
informative hypothetical surveys. American Journal of Agricultural Economics, 76,
1084-1088.
• Bliemer, M. & Rose, J. (2006) Designing stated choice experiments: The state of the
art. 11th International Conference on Travel Behaviour Research. Kyoto, Japan.
• Clarke, P. (2007) DAC Peter Clark’s speech on counter terrorism, http://cms.met.
police.uk/news/major_operational_announcements/terrorism/dac_peter_clark_
s_speech_on_counter_terrorism, Metropolitan Police, London.
• Clarke, P. (2008) Benefits and disbenefits of security initiatives. London (personal
communication).
• Collins, M. (1993) Strathclyde PTE focuses on safety of women passengers. Modern
Railways, 50, 141.
• Cozens, P.M., Neale, R.H., Whitaker, J. & Hillier, D. (2002) Investigating perceptions
of personal security on the valley lines network in South Wales. World Transport Policy
& Practice, 8, 19-29.
• Crime Concern/Transport and Travel Research (1997) Perceptions of safety from crime
public transport. Research report for the Department of Environment, Transport and
Regions. Department of Transport, London.
• Crossman, G., Kitchin, H., Kuna, R., Skrein, M. & Russell, J. (2007) Overlooked:
Surveillance and personal privacy in modern Britain. Liberty & The Nuffield Founda-
tion, London.
• Dame Eliza Manningham-Buller (2006) Official: Britain Tracks Terrorist Plots, http:
//www.cbsnews.com/stories/2006/11/10/ap/world/mainD8LADAJ02.shtml, CBS
News, New York.
• Evans, J. (2007) Speech: counter-terrorism and public trust, http://www.timesonline.
co.uk/tol/news/uk/article2810794.ece, Times Online, London.
• Greater London Authority (2006) Report of the 7 July Review Committee, http:
//www.london.gov.uk/assembly/reports/7july/report.pdf, Greater London Au-
thority, London.
• Hensher, D.A., Rose, J.M. & Greene, W.H. (2005) Applied Choice Analysis - A Primer,
New York, Cambridge University Press, New York.
• Hess, S., Rose, J. & Polak, J. (2008) Non-trading lexicographic and inconsistent be-
haviour in SP choice data. 87th Annual Meeting of the Transportation Research Board,.
January 13-17, Washington D.C.
17
• Hosein, G. (2008) National Identity Register, National DNA Databank, Data protection
law. London (personal communication).
• ICO (2007) Information Commissioner’s Office: Privacy impact assessment handbook.
London.
• Johnson, M. & Gearty, C. (2007) A Price worth paying? Changing public attitudes to
civil liberties under the threat of terrorism. British Social Attitudes: the 23rd Report
- Perspectives on a changing society. Sage Publications for NatCen, London.
• Joseph Rowntree Reform Trust (2008) ICM omnibus poll on ID cards and the govern-
ment’s handling of personal information, http://www.jrrt.org.uk/ICM%20Omnibus%
20poll%20-%203%20February%202008.pdf
• Kuhfeld, W. (2009) Marketing Research Methods in SAS: Experimental Design, Choice,
Conjoint and Graphical Techniques, Cary, NC, USA, SAS Institute Inc., Cary, NC,
USA.
• Kumaraguru, P. & Cranon, L.F. (2005) Privacy indexes: A survey of Westin’s studies,
Institute for Software Research International, Pittsburgh.
• Louis Harris, & Associates & Westin, A.F. (1994) Equifax-Harris Consumer Privacy
Survey. Technical Report Conducted for Equifax Inc. 1,005 adults of the U.S. public.,
Louis Harris & Associates, New York.
• Louviere, J. (1992) Experimental choice analysis: introduction and overview. Journal
of Business Research, 24, 89-96.
• Louviere, J. & Woodworth, G. (1983) Design and analysis of simulated consumer choice
or allocation experiments: an approach based on aggregated data. Journal of Marketing
Research, 20, 350-367.
• Louviere, J.J., Hensher, D.A. & Swait, J.D. (2000) Stated Choice Methods: Analysis
and Application, Cambridge, Cambridge Press, Cambridge.
• Ortuzar, J.D. & Willumsen, L.G. (2001) Modelling Transport, Chichester, John Wiley
& Sons, Ltd, Chichester.
• Rouwendal, J. & De Blaeij, T.A. (2004) Inconsistent and lexicographic choices in stated
preference analysis. Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper, Dept. of Economics. Free
University of Amsterdam, Amsterdam, Netherlands.
• Ryan, M., Bate, A., Eastmond, C.J. & Ludbrook, A. (2001) Use of discrete choice
experiment to elicit preferences. Quality in Health Care, 10, i55-i60. Smith, J. (2008)
The future of the National Identity Scheme to Demos on 6th March 2008, http://
press.homeoffice.gov.uk/Speeches/Speech-HS-Identity-Scheme1
• Srinivasan, S., Bhat, C.R. & Holguin-Veras, J. (2006) Empirical analysis of the impact
of security perception on intercity mode choice. Transportation Research Record, 2006,
9-15.
18
• UK Dept. for Transport (2005) Research findings: Attitudes to transport security after
July 2005 London bombings. London.
• UK Dept. for Transport (2006) Responsibilities of Transport Security’s Land Transport
Division,
http://www.dft.gov.uk/pgr/security/land/responsibilitiesoftransports4898
• UK Dept. for Transport (2008) Summary report of the ’LUNR’ passenger screening
trials, http://www.dft.gov.uk/pgr/security/land/lunr, London.
19
